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In order to obtain answers to some basic questions, potentially revealing
elements of Member State positions, we prepared a survey. At the be-
ginning of the project we neither knew the content of the proposal of the
European Commission, nor the positions of the European Parliament and
the respective Member States, so the problem required a broad approach.
The survey has been formulated with the aim of providing answers to a
number of questions that will probably appear in the EU budget debate.
They are based on previous proposals that have surfaced from the Com-
mission, the European Parliament and the respective Member States on the
one hand, and on the other, on the timetable and proposal that was
published by the Commission in September 2007.
The survey consisted of a questionnaire sent to different categories of
potential respondents: researchers, policy-makers active in their country of
origin, policy-makers representing their countries of origin in an EU insti-
tution, policy-makers active in an EU institution, and other respondents.15
The result is a sample that consists of 167 questionnaires, received from a
total of 23 Member States, on positions regarding the EU budget review.
More than half of those who answered are researchers; others are policy-
makers or people from the business sector. Naturally, there were some
missing answers to several questions, so the total number of answers may
vary in each case.
3.1 Questions and overall results
The questionnaire included fifteen questions, most of them including sub-
questions. In this way, the questionnaire remained concise (see the
questionnaire in the Appendix), but made it possible to provide relatively
detailed information on the most interesting issues concerning the EU 
budget. For some questions, besides encircling the answers chosen, the
respondents were given the possibility of expressing further remarks or
suggestions. They were also provided with this possibility at the end of the
questionnaire.
As in the case of most surveys of a similar type, one should be careful with
the results. The answers we obtained represent the personal opinions of
15 Such as civil servants, businessmen, journalists, lobbyists, former national and EU officials
and financial experts.
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people, many of them, however, involved – in one way or another – in some
phase of the review process or experts on the EU budget for a long period of
time. While our results are not representative purely from the statistical point
of view, they may be important because of the quality of the respondents.16
We sent the questionnaire to a limited number of people and our final
sample is even more limited, because, as usual with such exercises, the
majority did not reply. As a final result, we received 167 replies (filled in
questionnaires) from 23 Member States; the country and category distribu-
tion of our respondents is presented in the Appendix. An interesting general
feature is the overrepresentation of replies from most Central and Eastern
European countries: we made proportionally similar efforts in all Member
States, but the rate of return was very different. In some cases, we received
an explanation for this,17 in most cases we did not.
3.1.1 Size and general evaluation
In Questions 1 and 2 we asked the respondents to evaluate the present
system of own resources as well as that of the expenditure side. The
evaluation considered the fulfilment of the most important criteria that
have been judged several times by the European Commission as well as by
independent experts as being of paramount importance. Question 3, the
size of the EU budget, is one of the eternal key issues of debates between
Member States, so we included it in this general introductory part of the
questionnaire. The answers here are supposed to reflect the opinion of the
respondents about the size of the EU budget, given its present structure.
Let us now look at the results. As mentioned previously, Question 1 refer-
red to the evaluation of the present system of own resources on a scale of
one to five (five being the best score). Five aspects were presented and as
you can se in Figure 1, most of the responses in each of them hover
around the middle. “Transparency” was considered to be very poor and re-
ceived the lowest scores. At the other end of the scale, “sufficiency” was
evaluated as being very good, and obtained the most fives. “Financial
autonomy”, “fairness of gross contributions” and “efficiency” were evalu-
ated as being quite poor. The general picture (see Figure 1) is that the
respondents on average found the own resources system to be far from
optimal but the responses also reflect the well-known fact that, despite all
its shortcomings, it still functions.
16 Averages and standard deviation values of some scale-evaluation results are provided in the
Appendix.
17 e.g. in the case of the UK, we received some feedback from competent potential
respondents saying that until there is an official position of the country, they are not able or
willing to provide their opinion.
31
Figure 1 Evaluation of the present system of own  resources
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Figure 2 Evaluation of the present expenditure structure
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Table 1 “What size of the EU budget would best fi t the 
interests of your country?”
Share of EU GNI Number of answers Per cent
0-0.50 9 5.88
0.50-0.75 11 7.19
0.75-1.00 34 22.22
1.00-1.25 33 21.57
1.25-1.50 33 21.57
> 1.50 33 21.57
Total 153 100.00
Question 2 was put using the same logic as Question 1, but referred to the
expenditure structure of the EU budget. Answers here were somewhat more
critical than in the case of the system of own resources. Most respondents
circled two or three and the number of fives was very low for each of the
five angles. Some minor differences are worth mentioning: “adequacy” re-
ceived the highest number of ones. Interestingly, it was also given the highest
number of fives. “Efficiency” obtained fewer ones but and hardly any fives.
The higher number of fours renders “EU policies” and, more interestingly,
“fairness”, the best-regarded aspects of the EU budget expenditure structure.
Question 3 referred to the optimal size of the EU budget according to the
respondent. The distribution of the answers was fairly equal among the
pre-defined size categories, especially among those over 0.75% of the EU
GNI but most respondents opted for more than 0.75% of EU GNI.
Out of 153 responses, 33 respondents, or 21.57 % of those who answered
this question, indicated their preference for an EU budget greater than
1.5% of the EU GNI. Looking at the EU budget debates on relatively mi-
nor changes during the last decade, we may consider this a relatively high
share. Even more interesting is the fact that the specific size they indicated
varies from 2 to 15% of EU GNI. The presence of such a high figure im-
plies that the ideas presented in the 1977 MacDougall report are still with
us and may eventually be reinforced if political integration takes the EU
towards a more federative structure than today.
3.1.2 Own resources system
Questions 4–7 sought answers to the respondents’ opinions on the present
own resources system, as well as their openness towards reform. This was
put in a general way in Question 4, while questions 5–7 were related to
certain important specific issues of the own resources system. 
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As became clear when we discussed the answers to Question 1, the evalua-
tion of the present system of own resources was not very favourable.
Hence, it came as no surprise that 62% answered that a major or funda-
mental reform of the present own resources system was necessary. Figure
3 shows the shares of all pre-defined categories. The fact that only 4% of
all the respondents found no modification to the system necessary, while
an overwhelming majority, 96% of all the respondents, to a varying degree
wanted to change the system, is a very clear indication of the general
dissatisfaction with the present form of the own resources system.
Figure 3 Evaluation of the present own resources system
Fundamental
reform is a
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Major changes
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remain
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necessary (4%)
While Question 5 was about a present – and intensively debated – element
of the system (the UK rebate), Questions 6 and 7 tried to map the respon-
dents’ inclination towards a fundamental change on the revenue side of the
EU budget: the introduction of (a) genuine EU tax(es). We were aware of
the fact that such a change might seem radical to many of the respondents,
which is why we fine-tuned the question in two ways. First, we distin-
guished between the introduction of an EU tax without giving taxation
powers to the EU budgetary authority (Question 6) on the one hand and
giving taxation powers to the EU budgetary authority (Question 7) on the
other. Second, in both cases we posed the question in terms of different
time perspectives. Given the widespread hesitance towards the concept of
an EU tax, with all its implications, we worked with long-term perspec-
tives in order to avoid answers too influenced by the current political reality.
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The level of discontent with the UK rebate and other corrections of pay-
ments was even greater. As the answers to Question 5 indicate (see Table
2), more than 38 per cent of the respondents thought that a general correc-
tion mechanism should be introduced and according to more than 44 per
cent all corrections should be abolished. Although a general correction
mechanism and the abolition of all corrections are two very different solu-
tions, they would both put an end to the present situation of country-
tailored corrections. The total share of answers for these two categories
(over 83%) clearly shows that there are high expectations for change.
Questions 6 and 7 referred to the introduction of an EU tax in the near
future or in the long run. First (in Question 6) we were interested in the
opinion of the respondents regarding the possibility of introducing an EU tax
without giving the EU budgetary authority taxation powers. As we can see in
Figure 4, people had a fairly negative opinion on the introduction of a tax in
the short run. Within the ten-year-period category almost half (48%) of the
answers were negative. The answers were more balanced in the longer run.
The second variation of the same question (Question 7) asked for the pos-
sibility of introducing an EU tax giving the EU budgetary authority taxa-
tion powers (Figure 5). Here the position of the respondents was even
more negative than in the previous case. This time they also had a fairly
negative opinion for the longer term. This means that the prospect of giv-
ing taxation powers to the EU budgetary authority threatens significantly
the possibility of introducing an EU tax. 
3.1.3 Expenditure side
With Questions 8–11, we intended to obtain information about the respon-
dents’ opinion on the present expenditure items as well as possible future
expenditure needs of the EU budget. Questions 8 and 9 related to the cur-
rent (2007-2013) expenditure structure, and asked the respondents’ opinion
from two angles: the importance and the actual share of the main expendi-
Table 2 The UK rebate and other corrections of  payments
Number of answers Per cent
Good as is, no modiﬁ cation necessary 6 3.70
Should remain with minor modiﬁ cations 21 12.96
A general correction mechanism should be introduced 63 38.89
All corrections should be abolished 72 44.44
Total 162 100.00
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ture headings. Answers to both questions were supposed to contain valu-
able information on opinions on the possible restructuring needs of the
current expenditure structure.
Questions 10 and 11 went beyond the present expenditure structure, and
they did so in different ways. In Question 11, respondents were allowed to
Figure 4 Opinions on EU tax without EU taxation power
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Figure 5 Opinions on EU tax with EU taxation power
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specify any new expenditure items they wished to see in the EU budget (if
any). From the pool of answers it is possible to identify the most “popular”
potential new items. Question 11 was devoted to one specific aspect of
expenditure, namely (the supposed) additional expenditure related to
further enlargements. Previous enlargements – especially (but not only) the
accession of relatively less developed countries – have always caused ten-
sions around the EU budget negotiations, something that is not expected to
change in the foreseeable future. The question was also intended to specify
fears and expectations in this respect.
As mentioned above, in Question 8 we asked the respondents to assess the
importance of the present expenditure headings in the EU budget on a
scale of one to five. As Figure 6 shows, both competitiveness and cohesion
were ranked as being very important (four or five) by the vast majority of
the respondents. This is a very important and interesting finding: as you
may remember, in 2004-2005, these items were treated as part of a zero-
sum game, i.e. cohesion expenditure could be kept high mainly at the
expense of competitiveness expenditure (which still increased but from a
low level). This situation was the result of an earlier agreement on the
financing of CAP expenditure until 2013: as there was no willingness to
increase the size of the EU budget, there was no other way cohesion
expenditure could be salvaged.
Figure 6 Opinions on the importance of current expenditures
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This is the particular reason why it is interesting to note that the CAP was
regarded as unimportant or not very important by a clear majority of the
respondents – many of them from countries which benefit considerably
from the CAP. This is a very important finding, and – especially together
with the reactions on current rebates – may be perceived as a “wind of
change” (this perception seems to be confirmed by the country papers in
Chapter 4).
The other two items were judged to be of medium importance; although
European citizenship was regarded as less important than the EU as a
global partner.
Bearing these results in mind, answers to Question 9 were not surprising.
We asked respondents to evaluate the actual share of the expenditure items,
whether resources were considered sufficient or whether there were areas
where they should be increased or decreased. 77.6 per cent of the respon-
dents thought that the share of the item “Competitiveness for growth and
employment” should be greater. Half of the respondents thought that the
share of “Cohesion for growth and employment” and “The EU as a global
partner” should be increased. However, 65% expressed a preference for
decreasing CAP expenditure; according to 17%, the CAP should be abol-
ished altogether.
Figure 7 Opinions on the shares of current expenditures
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
The EU as a
global partner
European
citizenship
CAPCohesionCompetitiveness
More Less Unchanged Abolished
N
um
be
r o
f a
ns
w
er
s
38
Table 3 New expenditure items suggested by respondents
New items suggested Number of answers
Common energy policy 13
Defence 12
Climate change/environmental protection 10
Research & development/education 10
Immigration/social group integration/social policy 5
Labour market development/net job creation 3
More funds to solidarity, equality and gender issues 3
Foreign aid (make EDF part of the EU budget) 2
Culture 2
Infrastructure 1
Baltic Sea Strategy 1
Union integration projects 1
Common EU embassies 1
Conditional ﬁ nancial aid to North African countries* 1
The EU faces new challenges** 1
*  Condition: low level of illegal immigration to EU; aim: to motivate North African 
governments to better patrol their external borders, so as to alleviate pressures on EU 
social security systems and to make workers remain in their home countries.
**  Rising energy prices; demographic change; sustainable development; alleviating 
globalisation effects; and development of knowledge-based economy. The EU needs to 
refl ect, fi rst, on what the EU’s political priorities are – i.e. which challenges the EU should 
try to fi nd answers to – and, second, on how current EU policies could be adjusted to 
comply with these political priorities.
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To the question: “Would you like to see new expenditure items?” (Ques-
tion 10), 39 per cent answered “yes”. There were items mentioned several
times, like energy policy, defence and climate change. We grouped the
main areas raised by respondents in Table 3 stating the number of respon-
dents who mentioned them. A common energy policy, climate change and
environmental protection, R&D, development, education were not surpris-
ingly at the top of the list; meanwhile, it is interesting to note that Euro-
pean defence was also to be found there.
Regarding the question on further enlargements (Question 11) opinions
were divided. According to 52 per cent of the respondents the present EU
budget will not be able to deal with enlargement. Respondents gave vari-
ous reasons for this (see Box 3). Most answers emphasised the problem of
Turkey’s accession. Several respondents considered the present structure of
the CAP as a hindering factor. We grouped the answers according to the
score obtained in the box.
3.1.4 Present status and chances of the review
Questions 12–13 related to the relationship between Treaty obligations and
the EU budget. The answer to Question 12 was a simple evaluation of the
actual situation of how much the EU budget reflects the EU objectives laid
down in the Treaty. Question 13 was closely related to Question 12 but
more specific on the preferences of the respondents regarding EU objec-
tives laid down in the Treaty and their representation in the EU budget. 
Question 14 was about the current EU decision-making process. Here the
respondents were able to signal their desire for change in different areas.
They were also allowed to add their own suggestions beyond the ones of-
fered in the questionnaire.
In the final question, Question 15, we asked for the respondents’ perception
about the chances of the 2008/2009 EU budget review. The aim of the ques-
tion was to obtain an impression of the expectations of different groups of
professionals dealing with the EU budget regarding the chances of this
process at a stage when the process itself is expected to gain momentum.
The assessment of the present structure of the EU budget in relation to the
objectives set out in the Treaty (Question 12) is not very flattering. As is
shown in Table 4, the answers hovered mainly around the middle. More-
over, 82% of the respondents did not agree with the statement that any
costs accrued to Member States as a consequence of their fulfilling the ob-
jectives laid down in the EC Treaty should be funded by the EU budget
(Question 13).
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Box 3 Potential problems stemming from further enlargement
Remarks related to Turkey
• Too large a share to ineffectively centralised CAP. In case Turkey becomes a member the agricul-
tural policy will not be sustainable
• Accession of Turkey is the biggest problem, may become an incalculable risk. Probably impossible 
to accommodate Turkey within the present structure. The EU budget could in no way accommodate 
the accession of Turkey in 10-15 years. It will need to be thoroughly overhauled for this purpose 
- especially the CAP which should be abolished by the time Turkey joins the EU. CAP and Cohesion 
expenditure would under current conditions go largely to Turkey and the Balkans; therefore current 
Member States would see dramatic reductions in these receipts. Turkey would not ﬁ t in under the 
current structure, the Western Balkan states maybe;
• Possible accession of Turkey to the EU would cause substantial burden for the EU budget (espe-
cially in the area of Cohesion policy and Common Agriculture Policy of the EU). In that case EU 
should restrict the share of EU budgetary expenditures spent on Common Agriculture Policy and 
Cohesion Policy should be concentrated on the development of the regions lagging behind in the 
poorer Member States with GDP per capita below the EU average. In the case of future EU enlarge-
ments without Turkey the present structure of the EU budget would be considered sufﬁ cient.
Remarks related to the ﬁ nancial burden of enlargement
• Further enlargements (mainly involving much less developed countries) will mean new types of 
challenges;
• Current and potential candidate countries need higher ﬁ nancial support because they have much 
more complicated problems as compared to the previous enlargements;
• New Member States are even more underdeveloped and will thus require high levels of ﬁ nancial 
assistance. There is not enough money for enlargement;
• With its present structure the EU budget is not able to deal with the needs of further enlargements, 
especially in cases where enlargement refers to countries with huge populations and low standards 
of living;
• More funds are needed in order to better integrate Balkan states.
Remarks related to increasing differences
• Inequality in the EU is too big;
• More expenditures for cohesion is required;
• The current system does not adequately deal with regional differences in the Union, such as the 
greater importance of a particular policy for an individual region.
Other remarks
• Excessive bargaining power of core countries;
• Less attention should be given to juste retour;
• Too much money for agriculture and the Structural Funds. Too little money for research, education 
and innovation;
• A general correction mechanism should be introduced. Also greatest increases in the Budget 2008 
are related to internal policies for the Member States;
• No more enlargement, at least in ten years;
• May need to move to EU tax but not on business and only if corresponding reduction in other 
taxes.
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The respondents were not satisfied with the decision-making process ei-
ther. To Question 14 (Do you consider the EU decision making process op-
timal?), 77% of the sample answered “no”. They were allowed to choose
among five items in the questionnaire where changes could be implement-
ed and Figure 8 shows the distribution of answers among them. A majority
of 83 respondents would prefer changes in the decision-making process re-
lated to the Financial Frameworks, while half of the respondents felt that
changes are needed in the division of powers between the Council and the
European Parliament. 
In the final question (Question 15) the 2008/2009 budget review itself was
assessed. Only 5% of respondents expected short-term effects from the re-
view, while 68% of the respondents thought that it will lead to important
changes in the long run (i.e. after 2013). This picture, which could still be
viewed as quite optimistic, is somewhat modified by the fact that more
than a quarter of the respondents (27%) were quite sceptical, saying that
no changes will follow (see Figure 9).
3.1.5. Miscellaneous remarks by respondents
At the end of the questionnaire we gave respondents the opportunity to add
any remarks of their own. It turned out that 16 per cent of the sample used
this opportunity. While it is impossible to draw any general conclusions –
given the nature of the question – it is still worth looking at some major
points. These are given in Box 4.
Table 4 “To what extent do you think the EU budget structure 
refl ects the objectives laid down in the Treaty?”
Ranking Number of answers Per cent
1 5 3.07
2 36 22.09
3 75 46.01
4 46 28.22
5 1 0.61
Total 163 100.00
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Figure 8 Preferred changes in budgetary decision-making
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Figure 9 Opinions on the chances for budget review success
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• First, EU policies should primarily be targeted towards employment and competitiveness, not ex-
tensive GDP growth. Second, the EU should focus on education to motivate member governments 
to do the same. EU impact will be rather symbolic, but there is an opinion leader effect. Third, the 
CAP should focus on small farms and the production of organic food and in order to make the policy 
effective, the bureaucracy burden put on farmers has to be diminished substantially.
• Even though more weight should be given to public goods with a cross-border dimension, the 
stabilisation and distribution branches have been neglected in the Commission’s Communication. 
Although the time is not ripe for a full discussion, there are a number of interesting ideas that at 
least ought to be discussed (the idea of a European Unemployment Fund, for example). Moreover, 
redistribution is a feature of the EU budget today and should probably continue to be so in the future 
in light of forthcoming enlargements.
• Should a sufﬁ cient reform of expenditure be realised, general corrections would no longer be ne-
cessary. If, however, these reforms do not occur, a justiﬁ cation for corrections (speciﬁ c or general) 
remains.
• The Cohesion Policy should be focused on the least prosperous countries in the EU, much more 
than it is today. There are currently doubts about the effectiveness of the Cohesion Policy. If we can 
manage to reform the Cohesion Policy in such a way that it only supports the countries that need it 
and truly delivers results, then it would be the cornerstone of the EU budget.  
• The CAP should be abolished. A contingency agricultural fund should be set up instead. This fund 
should ﬁ nance the agricultural sector only in times of war or major global economic upheaval when 
international trade in foods and agricultural commodities is signiﬁ cantly hampered.
• The discussions on expenditure and revenue of the EU budget are unavoidably drifting towards 
juste retour logic and political deadlock. Separating the discussion on the revenue side, a greater 
autonomy in the own resources system would facilitate future discussions and would allow for the 
necessary ﬁ nancial development of the new European policies. Giving up the narrow net payments 
positions is a necessary pre-condition for the development of horizontal EU interests.
• The importance of issues (or the objectives in the Lisbon Treaty) need not be reﬂ ected in the EU 
budget. For example, the competition policy is an extremely important policy, but the EU does not 
need a lot of money to implement it. Moreover, the EU should be funded by the Member States in a 
way that is rather similar to the current system and should not collect its own resources.
• The present own resources system is inadequate, in practice it is more like a membership fee. Three 
sources should be considered. First, a European income tax with European progressivity (i.e. if per-
sons A in Bulgaria and B in Germany both earn EUR X, they would pay the same amount in taxes to 
the EU budget. The system would be fair since high income categories are smaller in Bulgaria than 
in Germany). It is feasible only without a tax increase (for public acceptance a general decrease 
would be desirable), only a new level would be brought in (the Union level). Second, VAT with a new 
structure: advantages are huge for consumers and the tax should be related to trade. Third, taxation 
of companies, who are the major beneﬁ ciaries of the Single Market. A pre-federal budget (2-2.5% of 
EU GDP) would be favourable (in the MacDougall sense). A complete reform of the CAP is needed. 
It is outdated, dysfunctional, and it leads to a suboptimal allocation of resources. Agriculture needs 
resources, but mostly for development. So instead of income and price support there should be 
targeted innovation, development and restructuring support. Special social problems in the agricul-
tural sector should also be dealt with. Some aspects should be included in regional development 
(rural areas). A EU tax authority should be gradually developed and the role of Parliament should be 
increased.
Box 4 Miscellaneous remarks by respondents
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Researchers were on average in favour of a much larger budget in terms of
EU GNI than non-researchers. Figure 10 shows that a budget larger than
1.25 or even 1.5% of the EU GNI was very popular among researchers,
while others preferred 1-1.25%.
In the case of the final category (above 1.5%) we asked for a specification.
The difference here was impressive: in the case of researchers (some of
3.2 Analysis according to groups
We analysed the results in two different of groups after having divided the
respondents in the following way:
1. according to their position: we distinguished researchers and others
(policy-makers or business people); and
2. according to country groups.
In the first group, there are 88 questionnaires filled in by researchers and
78 by others (mainly policy-makers in the given country or in the EU).
Since researchers and policy-makers have different working conditions and
work situations, it is possible that their opinions differ too. However, this
was not really revealed by the results. Responses were similar in almost all
the questions, there were only minor differences. Nevertheless, there is one
question where there is a clear significant difference: the desired size of
the EU budget.
Figure 10 Opinions on budget size: Researchers vs. Others
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them marked 15%) the average preferred size of the budget was 4.12%
while for the others it was 0.85%.
The second grouping was organised according to country groups, based on
certain important characteristics of the members of each group. We created
four groups of countries more or less according to their EU budget posi-
tion. The highest share in the sample, 49 per cent, included the Eastern
countries (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland,
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia), followed by the Rich Six (Austria,
France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK), with 26 per cent
of the replies. Finally, the Southern countries (Greece, Portugal and Spain)
and Other EU countries (Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland and Italy) had
similar shares in the sample (see Figure 11).18
Figure 11 Country groups: shares in sample
Eastern
(49%)
Southern
(13%)
Rich 6
(26%)
Other EU
(12%)
* Eastern: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia 
and Slovenia; Other EU: Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland and Italy; Rich 6: Austria, 
France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK; Southern: Greece, Portugal and 
Spain.
18 Traditional and actual net positions and related interests with regard to the EU budget
explain why some geographically Southern European countries are not part of our Southern
group.
In the following analysis, we examine the sections of the questionnaire
where there may be a significant difference between country groups. Ques-
tion 1 related to the evaluation of the present system of own resources.
Table 5 shows the distribution of answers among the groups. In the case of
each group we mark the highest percentage share of answers (by using
bold font in those cells). 
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Table 5 Evaluation of the present system of own resources 
(percentage)*
Financial autonomy 1 2 3 4 5
Eastern 3.90 23.38 40.26 28.57 3.90
Other EU 10.00 25.00 55.00 10.00 -
Rich 6 23.26 27.91 39.53 9.30 -
Southern 4.55 36.36 13.64 31.82 13.64
Efﬁ ciency
Eastern 5.19 29.87 23.38 32.47 9.09
Other EU 20.00 15.00 50.00 10.00 5.00
Rich 6 23.26 32.56 25.58 9.30 9.30
Southern 13.64 18.18 31.82 27.27 9.09
Transparency
Eastern 12.99 20.78 25.97 28.57 11.69
Other EU 15.00 40.00 30.00 15.00 -
Rich 6 45.24 30.95 11.90 9.52 2.38
Southern 9.09 18.18 13.64 59.09 -
Sufﬁ ciency
Eastern 5.19 23.38 23.38 27.27 20.78
Other EU 10.00 35.00 20.00 15.00 20.00
Rich 6 16.67 4.76 19.05 21.43 38.10
Southern 23.81 33.33 33.33 9.52 -
Fairness
Eastern 3.95 19.74 46.05 27.63 2.63
Other EU 5.00 30.00 25.00 40.00 -
Rich 6 7.14 30.95 30.95 28.57 2.38
Southern 9.09 27.27 27.27 36.36 -
* Eastern: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia 
and Slovenia; Other EU: Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland and Italy; Rich 6: Austria, 
France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK; Southern: Greece, Portugal and 
Spain.
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Table 6 Evaluation of the present system of expenditure 
structure (percentage)*
Adequacy 1 2 3 4 5
Eastern 15.58 22.08 45.45 14.29 2.60
Other EU 10.53 26.32 42.11 15.79 5.26
Rich 6 19.05 50.00 14.29 9.52 7.14
Southern 18.18 31.82 45.45 4.55 -
EU policies
Eastern 1.30 19.48 44.16 29.87 5.19
Other EU 15.79 31.58 31.58 21.05 -
Rich 6 9.52 38.10 33.33 19.05 -
Southern 18.18 36.36 31.82 9.09 4.55
Effectiveness
Eastern 5.13 29.49 51.28 12.82 1.28
Other EU 10.53 31.58 31.58 21.05 5.26
Rich 6 14.63 39.02 34.15 9.76 2.44
Southern 13.64 36.36 31.82 13.64 4.55
Efﬁ ciency
Eastern 5.13 29.49 48.72 16.67 -
Other EU 10.53 42.11 42.11 - 5.26
Rich 6 19.05 52.38 21.43 7.14 -
Southern 9.09 31.82 31.82 27.27 -
Fairness
Eastern 10.26 21.79 37.18 29.49 1.28
Other EU 10.53 15.79 36.84 26.32 10.53
Rich 6 14.63 41.46 26.83 17.07 -
Southern - 18.18 59.09 22.73 -
* Eastern: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia 
and Slovenia; Other EU: Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland and Italy; Rich 6: Austria, 
France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK; Southern: Greece, Portugal and 
Spain.
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As you can see, in the case of “Efficiency”, Eastern and Southern coun-
tries considered the system better than the Rich 6 (and the Other EU
group) and the situation is the same for “Transparency”. On the other
hand, in the case of “Sufficiency”, almost 40 per cent of the Rich country
respondents believe that resources are sufficient (since they are mostly
the donor countries) but others (mainly Southern countries) are not so
enthusiastic.
Table 6 shows the evaluation of the expenditure side. The results are quite
similar in each group with minor differences. Mediocre or bad (two and
three) are the most frequent answers.
Table 7 shows what size of EU budget would suit the interests of the country
groups. As you can see from Table 7, the opinion of the Rich 6 and the
Southern countries is different regarding the optimal size of the EU budget.
While respondents from the Rich 7 marked 0.75-1.00%, respondents from
Southern countries preferred higher than 1.5 per cent of EU GNI.
Regarding the possibility of introducing an EU tax the Rich 6 were gener-
ally the most sceptical both as concerns the short and the long-term (see
Tables 8a and 8b). This phenomenon is independent of the issue of giving
taxation powers to the budgetary authority. The Southern and the Eastern
countires were more optimistic.
There was a difference between the country groups regarding the import-
ance of the expenditure items in the EU budget. “Competitiveness for
growth and employment” was very important for all groups. At the
opposite end of the scale there was the evaluation of the CAP, i.e. it was
Table 7 Ideal size of the EU budget, % of EU GNI*
0-0.5 0.5-0.75 0.75-1.00 1-1.25 1.25-1.50 > 1.5
Eastern 7.89 5.26 22.37 18.42 25.00 21.05
Other EU - 5.56 27.78 27.78 11.11 27.78
Rich 6 8.11 10.81 29.73 21.62 18.92 10.81
Southern - 9.09 4.55 27.27 22.73 36.36
* Eastern: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia 
and Slovenia; Other EU: Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland and Italy; Rich 6: Austria, 
France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK; Southern: Greece, Portugal and 
Spain.
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Table 8a Introducing an EU tax without giving the EU budgetary 
authority taxation power (percentage)*
In < 10 years Positive Negative Neutral
Eastern 30.38 43.04 26.58
Other EU 20.00 55.00 25.00
Rich 6 28.21 64.10 7.69
Southern 36.36 31.82 31.82
In 10-20 years
Eastern 35.14 27.03 37.84
Other EU 25.00 37.50 37.50
Rich 6 27.78 55.56 16.67
Southern 33.33 33.33 33.33
In > 20 years
Eastern 37.50 25.00 37.50
Other EU 18.75 43.75 37.50
Rich 6 30.56 55.56 13.89
Southern 30.00 50.00 20.00
* Eastern: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia 
and Slovenia; Other EU: Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland and Italy; Rich 6: Austria, 
France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK; Southern: Greece, Portugal and 
Spain.
considered quite unimportant by all groups (the highest percentage came
from the Rich 6).  In the case of “Cohesion for growth and employment”
the picture was slightly more complex, and was most important for the
Eastern and Southern countries – presumably due to their lower develop-
ment level within the EU – and only moderately important for the Rich 6.
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“European citizenship” was slightly more important for the Eastern countries
(perhaps because they are new and “proud” EU members, but perhaps also
due to practical considerations, such as the high cost of protecting the EU’s
eastern borders), but on the whole it was of medium importance to the
respondents. “The EU as a global partner” was much more important for the
Rich and the Southern countries than for the Eastern countries and Other EU
group. This is probably because of the traditional historical and economic
ties between core EU countries (like the UK and France) or Southern coun-
tries (like Spain and Portugal) and less developed non-EU countries, such as
the former colonies in India, Africa and Latin America.
Table 8b Possibility of introducing an EU tax giving the EU 
budgetary authority taxation power (percentage)*
In < 10 years Positive Negative Neutral
Eastern 14.29 55.84 29.87
Other EU 31.58 47.37 21.05
Rich 6 17.50 72.50 10.00
Southern 36.36 40.91 22.73
In 10-20 years
Eastern 27.85 39.24 32.91
Other EU 33.33 33.33 33.33
Rich 6 28.95 57.89 13.16
Southern 28.57 47.62 23.81
In > 20 years
Eastern 34.67 29.33 36.00
Other EU 41.18 29.41 29.41
Rich 6 24.32 51.35 24.32
Southern 23.81 57.14 19.05
* Eastern: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia 
and Slovenia; Other EU: Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland and Italy; Rich 6: Austria, 
France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK; Southern: Greece, Portugal and 
Spain.
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Table 9 Evaluation of the importance of the expenditure items 
in the EU budget (percentage)*
Competitiveness 1 2 3 4 5
Eastern 3.85 7.69 10.26 30.77 47.44
Other EU 5.26 10.53 10.53 26.32 47.37
Rich 6 7.14 4.76 14.29 35.71 38.10
Southern - 9.09 31.82 36.36 22.73
Cohesion
Eastern 5.13 3.85 11.54 30.77 48.72
Other EU 5.26 5.26 21.05 42.11 26.32
Rich 6 7.14 16.67 30.95 26.19 19.05
Southern - 18.18 22.73 22.73 36.36
CAP
Eastern 24.36 28.21 20.51 11.54 15.38
Other EU 15.79 26.32 26.32 15.79 15.79
Rich 6 47.62 26.19 14.29 2.38 9.52
Southern 36.36 36.36 22.73 4.55 -
European citizenship
Eastern 9.09 19.48 33.77 27.27 10.39
Other EU 26.32 42.11 26.32 5.26 -
Rich 6 9.76 26.83 24.39 17.07 21.95
Southern 22.73 45.45 9.09 9.09 13.64
EU as a global partner
Eastern 7.69 11.54 30.77 28.21 21.79
Other EU - 42.11 21.05 15.79 21.05
Rich 6 7.14 4.76 28.57 26.19 33.33
Southern 18.18 18.18 13.64 18.18 31.82
* Eastern: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia 
and Slovenia; Other EU: Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland and Italy; Rich 6: Austria, 
France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK; Southern: Greece, Portugal and 
Spain.
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Figure 12a-e Preferred shares of present expenditure headings 
(percentage)*
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In accordance with the considered importance of the expenditure items, re-
spondents indicated whether they wanted see a lower or greater share of
the items in the budget. As Figure 12 shows, each group wanted more for
Competitiveness and Cohesion and less for the CAP. In the case of the
other two categories the picture was more mixed, the percentage share of
“unchanged” was higher.
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* Eastern: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia 
and Slovenia; Other EU: Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland and Italy; Rich 6: Austria, 
France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK; Southern: Greece, Portugal and 
Spain.
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As regards further enlargements, the opinions of the different groups were
mixed but respondents from Southern and Eastern countries were slightly
more optimistic than the others (Figure 13).
The differences were larger when the budgetary process was assessed: only
7.1 per cent of the Rich 6 thought that it was optimal, while among the
Southern respondents the figure was 41 per cent (Figure 14).
Due to the fact that the image of the budgetary process is so negative,
many respondents marked items to change. Almost 75% of the respondents
in the Eastern and 70% of the Southern countries but also almost 60% of
the Rich 6 marked “Decision-making related to Financial Frameworks” as
an area requiring change.
Figure 13 “Do you think the present structure of the EU budget 
will be able to deal with the needs of further enlarge-
ments?”*
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* Eastern: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia 
and Slovenia; Other EU: Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland and Italy; Rich 6: Austria, 
France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK; Southern: Greece, Portugal and 
Spain.
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Figure 14 “Do you consider the EU budgetary process 
optimal?”*
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Table 10 Would prefer changes in the…
 (per cent who found the process less than optimal)*
Eastern Other EU Rich 6 Southern
Annual decision-making 23.73 25.00 36.84 69.23
Decision-making related 
to Financial Frameworks
74.58 50.00 57.89 69.23
Voting rules in the 
Council
23.73 37.50 42.11 69.23
Division of powers,
the Council and the EP
33.90 62.50 45.95 15.38
Other 1.69 6.25 16.22 15.38
* Eastern: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia 
and Slovenia; Other EU: Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland and Italy; Rich 6: Austria, 
France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK; Southern: Greece, Portugal and 
Spain.
